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Stop deriving 2FA secrets from public uuid and username, which allowed anyone with those fields to forge valid codes. Generate secrets with TOTP::generate(), persist encrypted on users.two_factor_secret, and add regression tests for predictable-code rejection and normal 2FA flow. Existing Authenticator App enrollments must scan a new QR after deploy. https://processmaker.atlassian.net/browse/FOUR-34260
PR SummaryHigh Risk Overview Two-factor flow now snapshots login-time 2FA methods and delivery contact in session, provisions email/SMS codes from
2FA Blade views move to the shared auth layout; feature and unit tests cover predictable-code rejection, mixed-method enrollment, and API guardrails. Note: Existing Authenticator App users must re-scan QR after deploy. Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit 5bc0a82. Bugbot is set up for automated code reviews on this repo. Configure here. |
… users Stop deriving 2FA codes from public uuid and username. Persist CSPRNG secrets encrypted on users.two_factor_secret, add regression tests, and on login route legacy users without a secret to QR (auth app only) or force a fresh email/SMS code. Run the migration on deploy. Authenticator App users must scan a new QR. https://processmaker.atlassian.net/browse/FOUR-34260
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QA server K8S was successfully deployed https://tenant-1.ci-acbfe4bfe2.engk8s.processmaker.net |
- TwoFactorAuthNotification mail subject and body line - TwoFactorAuthController invalid code errors Fixes sync mail send hanging on /2fa when subject used _(). https://processmaker.atlassian.net/browse/FOUR-34260
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🔒 Agentic Security Review — 1 finding(s).
- [HIGH]
ProcessMaker/Http/Controllers/Auth/TwoFactorAuthController.php:137— A password-authenticated session that has not completed 2FA can GET /2fa/auth_app_qr. displayAuthAppQr only checks that a user is present, then generateQr calls getUserTotpSecret, which returns the stored two_factor_secret or mints one and saveQuietly()s it. That secret is placed in the otpauth provisioning URI and returned as the QR image. The same secret is used for email/SMS OTPs (sha512, 8 digits, 300s) and for authenticator codes (default 6-digit TOTP). validateCode treats any 6-character code as authenticator mode, does not consult getValid2FAPreferences, and the controller stores the result in 2fa-validated, which the 2fa middleware accepts as completion. This holds for email-only and SMS-only users and when a secret is already stored. The new redirect in displayTwoFactorAuthForm only sends authenticator-only users with an empty secret to this page; it does not authorize the route. Showing a QR once for that incomplete authenticator enrollment can stay; the route must not mint or re-show the secret for other methods or after a secret already exists, and a 6-digit code must be rejected unless Authenticator App is an enabled method.- Impact: An attacker who has the victim's password, or that pre-2FA session, recovers the long-term second-factor secret and can pass the 2FA gate without the victim's email, phone, or authenticator. two_factor_secret is now a confidential persisted credential rather than a value derived from public identity, but this path still discloses it to a session that has only passed primary authentication, and the shared secret unlocks email and SMS as well as authenticator.
- Remediation: Allow displayAuthAppQr to mint and show a QR only when Authenticator App is an enabled method and enrollment is still incomplete. After two_factor_secret exists, do not return it again to a session that has not just completed enrollment; require a verified second factor before any later display. Keep the email/SMS OTP secret separate from the authenticator secret, and in validateCode accept a 6-digit authenticator code only when Authenticator App is one of that user's enabled methods.
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QA server K8S was successfully deployed https://tenant-1.ci-acbfe4bfe2.engk8s.processmaker.net |
Refactor otp and auth_app_qr to extend auth.layouts.auth instead of legacy standalone HTML, background assets, and inline CSS. Use existing skip-language- selector and skip-auth-language-scripts sections so 2FA matches password-reset branding without changing the auth layout. https://processmaker.atlassian.net/browse/FOUR-34260
Use fresh() instead of User::refresh() on /2fa display so two_factor_secret is read from the database without invalidating permissions cache. https://processmaker.atlassian.net/browse/FOUR-34260
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🔒 Agentic Security Review — 1 finding(s).
- [HIGH]
ProcessMaker/Http/Controllers/Auth/TwoFactorAuthController.php:137— A password session that has not set 2fa-validated can GET /2fa/auth_app_qr and receive the durable TOTP seed in the provisioning QR. displayAuthAppQr only checks that a user is present, then generateQr embeds users.two_factor_secret in an otpauth URI. That same seed is what validateCode accepts: code length alone selects the 6-digit authenticator profile or the 8-digit sha512/300s email/SMS profile. After the seed exists, every later password login can read it again, and an email/SMS-only user can open the route directly even though authenticator is not their method.- Impact: This is the second-factor possession boundary. Password login already creates a session, and the 2fa middleware only wraps later application routes, so the pre-2FA session is the actor 2FA is meant to stop. The new stored secret is no longer recomputable from uuid and username, but this route still returns it, so a phished or reused password is enough to mint a valid code and set 2fa-validated. That includes users whose only methods are email or SMS, because their emailed or texted code is derived from the seed on the QR. The one-time authenticator enrollment redirect for an empty secret is the intended setup step; repeating the seed, or showing it when authenticator is not enabled, removes the second factor.
- Remediation: Serve the provisioning QR only for initial authenticator enrollment: authenticator must be an enabled method for that user, and two_factor_secret must still be empty. Call generateQr only in that case, then require a confirming code from the app. After the seed is stored, deny /2fa/auth_app_qr to any session that has not already passed 2FA, including a direct request when the challenge-page link is hidden. Do not create or return the email/SMS seed from this route. Keep validateCode from accepting a profile the user's enabled methods do not allow, so a seed disclosed during authenticator setup cannot also satisfy an email or SMS challenge.
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QA server K8S was successfully deployed https://tenant-1.ci-acbfe4bfe2.engk8s.processmaker.net |
…ment Store email/SMS TOTP in two_factor_delivery_secret and authenticator TOTP in two_factor_secret. Gate /2fa/auth_app_qr on enabled Authenticator App and empty enrollment secret; reject six-digit codes unless the method is allowed. Extend the users migration, tighten OTP link visibility, and add unit/feature coverage for predictable-secret bypass and QR route access. https://processmaker.atlassian.net/browse/FOUR-34260
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QA server K8S was successfully deployed https://tenant-1.ci-acbfe4bfe2.engk8s.processmaker.net |
Combine authenticator-method and existing-secret checks into one redirect to /2fa so displayAuthAppQr stays within the return-statement limit. https://processmaker.atlassian.net/browse/FOUR-34260
Extract authenticator QR redirect and send-code provisioning into private helpers so Sonar S3776 stays within the limit. https://processmaker.atlassian.net/browse/FOUR-34260
Accumulate validation in a $valid flag and return once so validateCode stays within the return-statement limit without changing 2FA verification behavior. https://processmaker.atlassian.net/browse/FOUR-34260
…id code Defer persisting two_factor_secret until a six-digit code verifies. Store the QR provisioning secret in session so enrollment can be retried without locking users out of the authenticator link or QR page. https://processmaker.atlassian.net/browse/FOUR-34260
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QA server K8S was successfully deployed https://tenant-1.ci-acbfe4bfe2.engk8s.processmaker.net |
Do not redirect authenticator-only users back to the QR page when PENDING_AUTHENTICATOR_SECRET is in session, so they can enter a code after scanning. Add a feature test that GET /2fa returns the OTP view after QR enrollment. https://processmaker.atlassian.net/browse/FOUR-34260
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QA server K8S was successfully deployed https://tenant-1.ci-acbfe4bfe2.engk8s.processmaker.net |
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QA server K8S was successfully deployed https://tenant-1.ci-acbfe4bfe2.engk8s.processmaker.net |
Return configureOtp result directly in TwoFactorAuthentication instead of assigning to $otp https://processmaker.atlassian.net/browse/FOUR-34260
Sonar flagged the private method as dead code after authenticator enrollment moved to pending session and resolveAuthenticatorSecret. Adjust unit test to assert stored secrets are not uuid/username-derived. https://processmaker.atlassian.net/browse/FOUR-34260
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QA server K8S was successfully deployed https://tenant-1.ci-acbfe4bfe2.engk8s.processmaker.net |
Address Cursor Bugbot finding: do not mint or accept a session TOTP when email or SMS is enabled and users.two_factor_secret is null. Gate QR route, validateCode, and OTP link; add feature regression test. https://processmaker.atlassian.net/browse/FOUR-34260
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QA server K8S was successfully deployed https://tenant-1.ci-acbfe4bfe2.engk8s.processmaker.net |
Mixed-method users need a validated email/SMS code before QR enrollment. Keep blocking password-only session minting (Cursor Bugbot). https://processmaker.atlassian.net/browse/FOUR-34260
…roll Set DELIVERY_STEP_UP after a valid email/SMS code and gate new authenticator binding on mayEnrollNewAuthenticator. Redirect to the QR screen after delivery step-up so enrollment is reachable in the login flow (Cursor Bugbot). https://processmaker.atlassian.net/browse/FOUR-34260
Snapshot challenge methods at login; block self-service API updates to preferences_2fa until TFA is validated. Gate authenticator enrollment on delivery step-up (session snapshot), redirect to QR after a valid delivery code, and clear 2FA session keys on logout. Address Cursor Bugbot findings. https://processmaker.atlassian.net/browse/FOUR-34260
Only block preferences_2fa when a login challenge snapshot exists and TFA is not validated; skip SSO and Bearer-only API profile updates. https://processmaker.atlassian.net/browse/FOUR-34260
Ignore TFA_VALIDATED from another user's cookie when updating preferences_2fa via API (Cursor Bugbot). https://processmaker.atlassian.net/browse/FOUR-34260
Gate self-service preferences_2fa updates on a completed web 2FA challenge bound to the authenticated user. Return 422 while the login challenge is pending, and skip the gate for SSO sessions. Refactor update() to a single response path so validation errors stop before any save or event dispatch. https://processmaker.atlassian.net/browse/FOUR-34260
…ble ones Stop deriving TOTP secrets from the user UUID and username. Authenticator secrets are now random and stored in two_factor_secret. A new authenticator can only be enrolled after a delivery-code step-up when the policy requires one, and the enrollment snapshot is taken at login. Remove the predictable secret generator and the unused getUserTotpSecret helper (Sonar S1144). Simplify validateCode and createOtpInstance to satisfy S1142 and S1488. https://processmaker.atlassian.net/browse/FOUR-34260
…onar S1142 Combine the existing-secret and missing AUTH_APP checks into one guard so the method stays within the three return-statement limit without changing enrollment behavior. https://processmaker.atlassian.net/browse/FOUR-34260
…2FA completes
Reject PUT /api/1.0/users/{user} when the principal updates their own
preferences_2fa while a login challenge snapshot is active, SSO is not in
use, and the web session has not completed 2FA for the same user id. Prevents
narrowing 2FA methods to skip delivery step-up during an in-progress challenge.
https://processmaker.atlassian.net/browse/FOUR-34260
Use a single final redirect with a $route variable instead of a separate return for authenticator QR enrollment, preserving mixed-method flow behavior. https://processmaker.atlassian.net/browse/FOUR-34260
…r S1142 and S3776 Address Sonar findings on UserController::update(): rule S1142 (too many return statements) and rule S3776 (cognitive complexity above the allowed threshold). Move post-fill validation and persistence into private helpers without changing behavior. The 2FA preferences_2fa gate, cell validation, email change checks, and save/avatar flow remain the same as before this refactor. https://processmaker.atlassian.net/browse/FOUR-34260
…validated web session Require web guard and TFA_VALIDATED for self-service preferences_2fa when global 2FA applies. Extract UserController::update validation helpers for Sonar S1142 and S3776. Add feature test with a valid update payload asserting the 2FA guard message. https://processmaker.atlassian.net/browse/FOUR-34260
Reject self-service PUT updates to preferences_2fa, email, and cell when global 2FA applies and the principal has not completed the web session challenge (TFA_VALIDATED), closing Bearer and password-only API bypasses of delivery step-up. Snapshot challenge delivery email and cell at login and send OTP to those targets. Add feature tests for stateless API preferences and email changes. https://processmaker.atlassian.net/browse/FOUR-34260
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Cursor Bugbot has reviewed your changes using high effort and found 1 potential issue.
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Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit 5bc0a82. Configure here.
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Null cell snapshot not frozen
Medium Severity
userForDeliveryChallenge only overrides cell when the session value is non-null. Login stores $user->cell, which is often null, and that is indistinguishable from “not snapshotted.” SMS then uses the live number, so a cell added after login still receives the same OTP as email.
Additional Locations (1)
Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit 5bc0a82. Configure here.
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Stop deriving 2FA secrets from public uuid and username, which allowed anyone with those fields to forge valid codes. Generate secrets with TOTP::generate(), persist encrypted on users.two_factor_secret, and add regression tests for predictable-code rejection and normal 2FA flow.
Existing Authenticator App enrollments must scan a new QR after deploy.
https://processmaker.atlassian.net/browse/FOUR-34260
ci:deploy